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Abstract

A number of recent studies have argued that municipal governments have so significantly
modified elements of their form of government that it is now difficult to distinguish form.
However, none of these studies considers the influence of state government on these choices.
This study uses a comprehensive dataset of U.S. municipal governments with populations of at
least 10,000 and a dataset of state legislative provisions related to form of government to
investigate the influence of state law on municipal form of government choices. The findings
demonstrate that state law is associated with some choices of government form and that
structures that hybridize the council-manager and mayor-council forms of government are still
relatively uncommon.
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Local government structural arrangements—specifically, how legislative and
administrative powers are distributed—have important implications for the overall function of
government. Form of government, the extent of authority granted to elected and appointed
officials, and the level of autonomy granted the government by the state to make structural
changes all shape the relationships that develop among officials and have implications for overall
governmental efficiency and effectiveness. Prior research has explored factors that contribute to
the adoption of various forms of local government (Dye and Macmanus, 1976; Kessel, 1962) but
there has been limited consideration of state government influence on form of government
choices.
Recently, scholars have advanced the idea that municipal leaders are increasingly
choosing to alter their local government form and structure to better meet the needs of their
citizens (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004; Mullin, Peele,
& Cain, 2004). Missing in the literature is a discussion of constraints on local government
leaders who wish to alter their institutional arrangements. In particular, state law often places
specific restrictions on local government form and electoral arrangements; in some cases, state
law delineates mayoral authority and responsibilities. Whereas studies of structural change
(DeSantis & Renner, 2002; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood, 2004; MacManus & Bullock,
2003; Mullin, Peele, and Cain, 2004; Protasel, 1988) make the implicit assumption that the
change reflects a local choice or local conditions, it is possible that state statutes or constitutional
law mandate municipalities to choose certain features.
An analysis of the number of municipalities in the United States using various forms of
government, even when using accurate data, gives a limited picture of the form of government
issue. This paper attempts to fill in that picture. How common are deviations from standard

municipal government form? Are these deviations from the standard features of the councilmanager or mayor-council forms of government attempts to adapt to today’s challenges, or are
they a result of state statutory provisions that dictate differences from these standard forms? It
seems logical that, given the freedom to do so, municipalities would customize their government
structures to fit the needs of the community, but this has never been tested empirically.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, I seek to summarize the differences between
states in legal provisions related to municipal form of government. Second, I explore whether
these differences result in the adoption of alternative forms of government in municipalities,
controlling for region, population growth, per capita income, and population density.
In states with liberal provisions related to the level of municipal autonomy, states afford
local governments the ability to modify their government form; here I expect to find greater
variation in form of government. For states with greater restrictions, I expect to find less
flexibility related to municipalities’ ability to alter their institutional features and therefore a low
proportion of municipalities that depart from the norm—either by blurring the lines of separation
of powers in mayor-council governments or by empowering the mayor in council-manager
governments.
As an initial exploration of this topic, this paper focuses on provisions in state statutes
and constitutions that limit local government institutional arrangements. State law may not only
prevent municipalities from altering their form of government but may also mandate deviations
from standard forms of government. It is difficult to make predictions of the behavior of
municipalities without knowing how much autonomy has been granted at the state level.
This study has three parts. I begin with a discussion of municipal form of government,
summarizing the literature on the primary forms of municipal government in the U.S., factors

that constitute functional deviations from those forms, and research that argues American cities
are actively engaged in seeking to alter their form of government. In the second section, I
provide a descriptive analysis of state law related to municipal form and structure. The objective
of this research is to provide an analysis of the range of control states maintain over local
government form and structure, something that is lacking in the extant literature. I finish the
study with a set of regression models that test the proportion of forms of government in the states
against state structural autonomy, region, population growth rate, population density, and per
capita income, to determine whether the level of state control is predictive of the form of
government choices made by municipalities.
Municipal Form of Government Research
Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Forms of Government
Although there are four broad categories of municipal governmental form in the United
States—council-manager, mayor-council, commission, and town meeting—this paper focuses on
the two most common, council-manager and mayor-council forms. For each form, there are a set
of characteristics that serve to identify an ideal or “pure” type of that form. Mayor-council
governments are characterized by the separation of legislative and executive powers, similar to
the federal system at the national level. They have an elected mayor, who serves as the chief
executive of the municipality and is a full-time, salaried employee. An elected council, the
members of which are elected by district, is responsible for the legislative functions of the
municipality. The mayor typically does not have an official role on council but usually has veto
power.
Council-manager governments, also called reform governments, have unified executive
and legislative powers in an elected council of which the mayor is a member. The mayor is

chosen from among the other council members rather than being elected at-large, presides and
votes in council meetings, and does not have the power of veto. Developed during the
Progressive Era to combat the corruption caused by machine politics, the council-manager
government typically has council members who are elected at-large in non-partisan elections.
Council members delegate administrative responsibility to a professionally trained manager who
is appointed and removed by the council.
In practice, many variations in these two forms exist. Some of the more common are the
popular election of the mayor in council-manager governments and the addition of a chief
administrator in mayor-council governments. In fact, data show that for municipalities with
populations of at least 10,000 a council-manager government with a popularly elected mayor is
the most common form of local government in the U.S., and mayor-council municipalities are
equally likely to have a chief administrative officer (CAO) than not. 1 One key issue is whether
these modifications change the essential nature of the form of government—the distribution of
legislative and executive powers. Although determining policy implications from the use of
alterations to the traditional forms of government is beyond the scope of this paper, certain
structural characteristics can be used to identify those municipalities that have combined
elements of each form to create an effective hybrid. A second important consideration is
whether state statutes mandate or limit these modifications.
Identifying Hybrid Local Governments
In order to explore the influence of state laws on municipal governments’ structural
choices and the ability to hybridize their forms, it is important to discuss earlier research on form
of government modifications and to present a definition of what constitutes a hybrid in the
present research context. There are two contrasting views on this subject.

The adapted cities model (Frederickson and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and
Wood, 2004) asserts that American municipalities are transforming. The authors argue that their
“research finds that the detailed features of these traditional models [mayor-council and councilmanager] have been so mingled as to all but eliminate the importance of the formal designation
of a city as either a mayor-council or council manager-city” (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood,
2004, 7). Frederickson et al. present evidence that there are national trends towards greater
mayoral authority in council-manager governments and greater professionalism in mayor-council
governments. This argument makes the assumption that the municipalities have the power to
adjust their structures at will when this may not be the case in all states.
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) are not alone in their argument that
municipalities are becoming too hybridized to sustain the two major categories of form of
government (DeSantis and Renner, 2002; MacManus and Bullock, 2003). These authors argue
in support of different typology methods to categorize contemporary American municipalities.
Using five variables, the authors propose three categories of council-manager form and four
categories of mayor-council form. The variables used to distinguish categories of form are the
form of government identified on the survey (council-manager vs. mayor-council), presence or
absence of a CAO, mayoral selection method, mayoral veto power, and assignment of budgetary
formulation and department head appointment authority. Cities that fit in none of the categories
remained unclassified.
All of these studies have a number of limitations. First, they do not distinguish between
those governmental features that change the distribution of legislative and administrative powers
from those features that merely alter the process of governing. In order to be a hybrid, there
must be some shift in the assignment of legislative or executive functions. Second, accurate

longitudinal data tracing changes in form of government are difficult to find, as are current data
on very specific structural features (such as budgetary or department head appointment
authority).
In a more recent study, Nelson and Svara (2010) present a new typology of municipal
government form that is based on distinguishing between those forms that preserve the
separation of powers (mayor-council types) and those that have unified powers (council-manager
types). They argue that only those municipalities that blend the power relationships are truly
hybridized, leading to the conclusion that there are many fewer hybridized governments in the
United States than indicated by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004).
Attempting to address the limitation of earlier studies, Nelson and Svara (2010) argue
that many of the features used in earlier reclassification attempts are not related to the
distribution of powers in local government. In addition, they argue that some variables used in
earlier studies, such as identifying who has the authority to draft a budget, are difficult to
determine with accuracy.
In contrast to earlier studies, Nelson and Svara’s (2010) typology for form of government
is based on whether modifications to council-manager and mayor-council forms have the
potential to change the balance of power within the municipal government between the mayor,
the council, and the CAO. For municipalities with a population of at least 10,000, the
distribution of the seven variations is presented in Table 1. The first two variations are councilmanager governments, Variation 1, council (mayor)-manager, with an appointed mayor, and
Variation 2, mayor-council-manager with an elected mayor. The final three variations are types
of mayor-council governments. According to Nelson and Svara, the only true hybrids are
variations 3 and 4; the council-manager form with an empowered mayor and a mayor-council

form with a council that is atypically powerful, having authority to appoint the CAO. Nelson
and Svara argue that in municipalities having these arrangements, the balance of legislative or
executive power is shifted. Hybrids do not make up a large percentage of municipal
governments overall, belying the idea that municipalities are rapidly hybridizing. Hybrid mayorcouncil governments are considerably more common than the hybrid council-manager type.
In order to gauge the effect of state legislative control over municipal structure, I use the
Nelson and Svara typology and determine the percentage of each variation in form of
government in each state. These percentages are the dependent variables in the quantitative
portion of this study.
Table 1. Nelson and Svara 7‐Category Form of Government Typology (Population > 10,000)
Variation
1
2

Council (Mayor)‐
Manager
Mayor‐Council‐
Manager

How is mayor
selected in council‐
manager form?*
Appointed by council
Directly elected

CAO?

CAO
appointment

% of total
cities

Yes

Council

20.9 (601)

Yes

Council

34.6 (996)

Council‐manager
or other

Yes

Mayor
nominates,
council
approves

0.7 (20)

Yes

Council

8.3 (239)

Yes

Mayor
nominates,
council
approves

9.1 (261)

Yes

Mayor

5.1 (147)

No

N/A

21.4 (615)

Nominal Form
Council‐manager
or other
Council‐manager
or other

3**

Empowered mayor‐
council‐manager

4**

Mayor and Council‐Administrator

Mayor‐council or
other

5

Mayor‐Council‐Administrator (M‐C‐A)

Mayor‐council or
other

6

Mayor‐Administrator‐Council (M‐A‐C)

7

Mayor‐Council

Total

Directly elected

Mayor‐council or
other
Mayor‐council or
other

2879

* Nine municipalities select their mayors according to the council candidate who receives the highest number of votes in the
at‐large election; those communities are not included in the analysis.
** These categories are considered hybrids of council‐manager and mayor‐council forms.
(From Nelson and Svara 2010, p. 555)

A final limitation of earlier studies is one I address in this article—that state level
intervention might be at work in limiting or permitting local level structural modification. I
attempt to determine whether the few states with considerable numbers of municipalities having
truly hybridized their governmental form (Nelson and Svara’s categories 3 and 4) have greater
structural autonomy provided in state law or perhaps they are mandated to adopt exceptions to
the traditional features of council-manager or mayor-council form.
Factors that Influence Choice of Local Government Form
A number of earlier studies have sought to determine the factors that influence the
adoption of structural reforms at the local level (Kessel, 1962; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Dye &
Macmanus, 1976; Protasal, 1988; Dye, 1991). While these studies test a number of variables,
including region, population, growth rate, density, partisanship, minority population, and
economic base, the findings are mixed. The exception is region; data show that council-manager
governments are more common in the south and west than they are elsewhere in the country
(Montjoy & Watson, 1993).
In one of the earliest and most comprehensive studies of predicting local government
structure, Dye and Macmanus (1976) used discriminant function analysis to determine what
variables predict form of government and election procedures. They found that form of
government was related to percent of the population that was foreign born, region, and
socioeconomic indicators (although only within regions, not nationwide).
Simmons and Simmons (2004) have published the most recent study analyzing the
motivations behind changes in municipal form of government. They included a large number of
independent variables to attempt to determine what factors were associated with movement
towards the council-manager or mayor-council form. In contrast to earlier studies, their findings

suggest that Southern cities are more likely to move towards the mayor-council form instead of
the council-manager form. Other variables associated with movement towards the mayorcouncil form were larger minority populations and declining manufacturing cities. Movement
towards adoption of council-manager form was associated with rising educational levels and a
growing professional workforce.
This study takes a different approach from that used by earlier scholars. Instead of
examining attributes of the communities themselves and whether those attributes are related to
the choice of local form of government, I seek to determine the degree to which state law
influences those choices—particularly those choices that result in a hybrid of the two major local
government forms.
Autonomy and Institutional Change
While there have been no studies that examine the effect of state control over form of
government choices in municipalities, there have been a number of studies that investigate the
role of the state in other elements of local government activities and institutional change.
The study that most resembles the current project is an examination of county structural
reforms—hiring a CAO, adopting a charter, or electing a county executive. Marando and Reeves
(1993) found that urbanization and state were the key explanatory variables related to counties
adopting one of the three reforms. They do not, however, attempt to operationalize the level of
state legal control over county structural reform.
A number of researchers have examined the effect of state statutes and policies on the
fragmentation of local government authority through the formation of special districts. Bollens
(1986) found that state laws regulating tax, expenditure, and contractual limitations on local
governments encouraged the formation of special districts. Foster (1997) had mixed findings in

her study. While debt limits seemed to promote formation of special districts, property tax limits
had the inverse effect. In a later study, Carr (2006) found considerably less evidence of this
relationship, finding instead that only tax and expenditure limitations had an effect on the
number of special districts.
Researchers have also found that states influence local government financial choices,
cooperative agreements, and annexations. Farnham (1988) found that state-imposed debt limits
were related to lower debt per capita in the sample communities. State tax and expenditure
limitations have been found to influence the revenue structures of counties (Johnston, Pagano,
and Russo, 2000). In their study of the effects of state fiscal, structural, functional, and
administrative autonomy granted to local governments, Carr and Feiock (2001) found the inverse
of their expectation—regulations intended to reduce annexations were instead related to higher
numbers of annexation. Finally, Krueger and Bernick (2009) found limited support for their
hypothesis that greater state constraints on local governments related to property tax generation,
annexation, and the creation of special districts would lead to an increased interest in forming
cooperative agreements with other local governments.
Data and Methods
Data used for this study were obtained from two sources. For the form of government
variables, this project used a comprehensive dataset of form of government for U.S.
municipalities with populations greater than 10,000 2 . This municipal form of government
dataset was created by merging three datasets—two form of government survey datasets from
the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) and a third from the National
League of Cities (NLC) on form of government. The data were then screened for discrepancies
between the three datasets and corrected; missing data were filled in by obtaining copies of

charters and ordinances for the municipalities. The dataset is updated regularly as municipalities
make changes to their government form and is comprehensive, containing data for 3,096
municipalities. 3
Document analysis provided the source for the second set of data. I compiled the second
dataset from state statutory and constitutional provisions related to form of government.
Specifically, the statutes and constitutions were read to determine home rule powers, types of
government structures permitted by state law, regulations that limit institutional flexibility
determined by the categories of communities, and the ease with which municipalities are able to
make modifications in form. All of the state documents are available via the internet. From this
research, I compiled a database of 49 states (Hawaii was excluded since it only has one
municipality) that included form of government variables, items related to executive authority,
and factors that address overall local government autonomy. Demographic variables used in the
study are from the 2000 U.S. Census.
Much of the data presentation is descriptive. There has been no previous comprehensive
review of state provisions related to local government structure. The objective of the descriptive
analysis is to assess the legal restrictions states place on municipal governments that curtails their
ability to modify their form of government. Findings are presented for form of government,
mayoral characteristics, and provisions related to chief administrators. When the data are
available, state characteristics are compared to the distribution of local government structural
features, specifically, form of government, mayoral authority, and presence or absence of a chief
administrator.
Using Nelson and Svara’s (2010) 7-category form of government variable, I determine
the distribution of variations in form of municipal governments throughout the U.S. The

hypothesis for this study is that the level of autonomy granted to local governments by the state
to modify their form of government is related to the adoption choices of form of government.
Since mayor-council government is the default form in most state statutes, I expect to find that
greater levels of autonomy lead to higher rates of adoption of the council-manager and mayorcouncil-CAO forms of government and lower rates of adoption of the traditional mayor-council
form. Higher levels of autonomy should also be related to the proportion of hybrid government
forms in the state. To explore the effects of state legislation on form of government choices, I
use state structural autonomy as the primary independent variable.
To determine whether local governments do have the power to modify their form, I
created a dataset by finding provisions in each state’s constitution or statutes related to structural
authority of municipal governments. These provisions include structural home rule power and
the ease with which municipalities may add provisions that modify their form of government.
Twenty-eight states give the majority of their municipalities the power to customize their form,
while twenty-one do not. I created a seven-category scale consistent with the Nelson and Svara
typology as the structural autonomy variable. The 28 states that give most municipalities the
power to customize form at will, received a score of 7. The other states received scores of 2-7
corresponding to the number of variations in form the majority of municipalities are permitted to
adopt. For example, the state of Delaware does not restrict local form of government, so
Delaware was coded 7. In some states, only home rule communities are provided that level of
autonomy. In other cases, such as New Jersey, state statutes provide for all of the form of
government variations as optional forms. In some cases, home rule is granted to only a minority
of cities over 10,000 in population, in those states statutory provisions that designate form of

government are used to determine the value of the primary independent variable (see Appendix
A for state coding).
I also included control variables in the study. Since previous research found region
significantly related to the choice of form of government (Dye and Macmanus, 1976; Dye,
1991), I included region as a control variable coded as a three-category dummy variable with the
northeast as the benchmark variable. Two population variables—population growth between
1990 and 2000 and population density per square kilometer (in the year 2000)—were also used
in the analysis. Finally, I added state per capita income for 1999 as a measure of economic
health.
The unit of analysis for this study is the state; I excluded Hawaii due to the small number
of municipalities in the state (n = 49). The dependent variables in the study were the percentage
of each of the seven categories of forms of government identified by Nelson and Svara (2010) in
municipalities with populations over 10,000, per state. I ran separate regression models for each
variation of government, for a total of seven models.

Findings
State legal provisions can lead to exceptions to the pure forms of municipal government
in one of three ways—the law mandates an exception to the traditional characteristics, the law
expressly gives the option to adopt an exception, or the state gives municipalities the power to
change their institutional features at will (through home rule or special charter powers). A more
complete picture of how these deviations occur can be developed by presenting descriptive data
comparing state law to outcomes in overall form and more detailed institutional features.

Form of Government
While municipalities can be governed using one of four general structural forms: mayorcouncil, council-manager, town meeting, or commission form, analysis for this study was limited
to mayor-council and council-manager governments. Nearly half of the states (N = 21) use the
mayor-council form as the default form of government, meaning that state law dictates mayorcouncil form as the starting point for new local governments (Table 2).
The majority of states permit both council-manager and mayor-council forms of
government (26) for municipalities of any size or classification. Ten additional states put no
prohibitions on form of government for municipalities. Utah removed the council-manager form
as an option in the statutes effective 2008; however, municipalities may adopt the councilmanager government by drafting charters. Nine states do not mention form of government in
state statutes.
In some cases, although states permit council-manager governments, municipalities must
meet highly restrictive conditions in order to enact that form. For example, in Indiana, only
towns or cities of the third class (fewer than 35,000 residents) can have an appointed manager;
state law also mandates that the mayor appoint the manager, not the city council. Nebraska uses
population to designate which municipalities can use the council-manager form of government
(i.e., municipalities with populations of 1,000-200,000). Both Indiana and Nebraska have
essentially prohibited the largest municipalities in those states from adopting the councilmanager form. Similarly, Louisiana has expressly barred New Orleans from adopting the
council-manager form. In Alabama, municipalities with 300,000 or more residents cannot adopt
the statutory council-manager form, but they can add a manager by passing an ordinance.
Nevada also restricts the use of the council-manager form. Most municipalities operate under a

general charter which is based on a mayor-council form of government. In order to adopt the
council-manager or commission form, the municipality must obtain a special charter.
Table 2. Legal Arrangement and Form of Government*
Municipalities over 10,000 population
The categories below are not mutually exclusive

M‐C%

MC‐CAO%

C‐M%

Mayor‐council form is the default form (N = 21)

30.99

25.42

43.59

State expressly permits mayor‐council form (N = 40)

25.82

23.04

51.14

State expressly permits council‐manager form (N = 26)

23.31

17.73

58.96

Council‐manager form restricted to cities in minimum
population class (N = 8)

29.82

31.15

39.03

* Numbers in brackets represent the number of states with legal provisions that permit each form of government. The
percentages are the mean percentage adoption rates of those forms within the states represented by N.

State law regarding form of government seems to have a mild influence on
implementation. In the states that identify the mayor-council form as the default, the majority
(56%) of municipalities with populations above 10,000 use the mayor council form or mayorcouncil with CAO (see Table 3). Restricting council-manager form according to population
leads to a minority of municipalities adopting that form of government (39%) while nationwide,
a majority of municipalities in the 10,000 or greater population range use the council-manager
form (57%, from the Municipal Structure Dataset).
Despite these weak patterns, there are a number of states in which permitting a range of
choice has made much difference. Some states that provide for optional forms of government
have seen limited implementation of certain options. For example, municipalities in Arkansas,
Idaho, and South Dakota, have only a handful of municipalities using the council-manager form
of government. However, in North Dakota, half the municipalities use commission or councilmanager forms of government.
In some cases, states permit the addition of an appointed chief administrator to handle
operations, usually, but not always, under the direct authority of the mayor. Municipalities are

permitted by state law to add a professional chief administrative officer (CAO) in 19 states. In
three states (Alabama, Arkansas, and Washington) a city must fall into a particular population
classification in order to hire a CAO (see Table 3). Alabama, for example, permits chief
administrators in mayor-council municipalities with a minimum population of 250,000 (Code of
Alabama Title 11 Ch. 43 §11-43-81.1 (1975)). Most states place no provisions related to an
appointed chief administrator in the statutes but home rule and charter municipalities are usually
free to add a chief administrator in those cases.
Table 3. Legal Arrangement and Use of CAO*
Are CAOs permitted by state law?
Yes (19)
Yes w/ pop requirement (3)
Not specified (27)
Total (49)

M‐C%

MC‐CAO%

19.42
60.06
24.75
26.30

28.45
11.73
17.46
18.97

* Numbers in brackets represent the number of states with legal provisions that permit each form of
government. The percentages are the mean percentage adoption rates of those forms within the
states represented by N. Municipal population 10,000 and greater.

Not surprisingly, a greater number of municipalities add a chief administrator when
statutes expressly permit it than in states that do not contain a CAO provision in their laws.
More than 28% of municipalities in states with unrestricted laws permitting CAOs have chief
administrators while only 17% of municipalities have chief administrators in states that do not
specify the addition of a CAO. In the three states that restrict the addition of the CAO to a
certain population, fewer than 12% of municipalities use a chief administrator.
Mayors and State Law
Simply knowing the form of government alone does not necessarily give a full picture of
limitations the state may place on institutional construction at the local level. States that restrict
criteria for selection of the mayors or chief administrators or that designate specific powers for
each are able to substantially curtail structural autonomy at the local level. For example,

Frederickson et al (2004) suggest that council-manager municipalities have chosen to elect their
mayors directly in order to strengthen political leadership. In twelve states, however, that choice
has been made at the state level, and council-manager municipalities are limited to a single
procedure for mayoral selection—either to elect the mayor at-large or have council select the
mayor from among its ranks (see Table 4). The most common method is election at-large (N =
9). Eight states give council-manager municipalities the option to choose from two or more
methods for mayoral selection. The remaining states either do not specify a procedure for
mayoral selection or allow municipalities to customize their structure, including choice of
mayoral selection method.
Table 4. Legal Arrangement for Selection of Mayors in
Council‐Manager Municipalities*
Method
Elected at‐large
Selected by council
Multiple methods permitted
No provision in state law/structural home rule
Depends on population class
Total

Number
9
3
8
28
1
49

*Municipal population 10,000 and above.

With regard to municipalities with mayor-council governments, 31 states require that the
mayors be elected at-large, as indicated in Table 5. Although the legal arrangements might
suggest that there would be some variation in actual practice, virtually all—98.6%—of mayorcouncil mayors in municipalities with population 10,000 and above are directly elected.
Table 5. Mayoral Selection in Mayor‐Council Municipalities
Method of Mayoral Selection
Elected at‐large
Appointed by council
Multiple methods permitted
No provision in state law
Depends on population classification
Total

N
31
1
8
9
1
50

%
62
2
16
18
2
100

In addition to limiting how mayors may be selected, state law may also prescribe specific
mayoral powers and responsibilities. In this study, I examine state law pertaining to the mayor’s
authority to vote in council sessions, veto ordinances, and appoint city staff members. Although
these powers do not necessarily alter the balance of power between the mayor and council, a
number of earlier studies on form of government have argued that they are important
considerations. Twenty-one states grant mayors the power to vote on all council matters in
council-manager governments while only 11 states grant mayors voting power in mayor-council
governments (see Table 6). In addition, 18% of states grant mayors the right to vote with
conditions in council-manager governments, generally the condition is to break a tie vote. Veto
power is most often denied to mayors in council-manager municipalities (24 states) although
state law is silent on this matter in 16 states. In contrast, 24 states grant veto power to mayors in
mayor-council governments, and only six deny it.
Table 6. State Legal Provisions on Mayoral Power
Mayoral Power
Vote
Veto
Appointment
Vote
Veto
Appointment

Yes

No

Council‐Manager
45%
12%
10%
49%
4%
67%
Mayor‐Council
25%
18%
49%
12%
67%
4%

Conditional

No provision in
state law

18%
10%
4%

25%
31%
25%

37%
10%
4%

20%
29%
25%

Following the standard characteristics of mayor-council governments, authority to
appoint city staff is overwhelmingly more common for mayors in mayor-council governments
(permitted in 33 states) than for mayors in council-manager governments (permitted in four
states). These results indicate that states generally reinforce the standard features of each form of

government. Still, a sizeable minority of states (five to ten depending on the power in question)
require a feature of government that differs from the standard characteristics.
City Managers and State Law
States that formally provide for council-manager governments also tend to exercise
control over the selection of managers and the duties that they may perform. Every state except
Utah (although some municipalities are grandfathered in) allows at least some municipalities to
use the council-manager form, either because the states have no restrictions on municipal
government form or because state statutes explicitly provide for the council-manager form of
government as an option for municipalities. Thirty states (61%) contain statutory provisions
mandating that city managers be appointed based on professional qualifications for the job
(Table 7), the other states have no provisions related to managerial qualifications.
Table 7. City Managers and State Legal Provisions
State Law Mandates:
Yes
No

Minimum Professional
Qualifications for Manager
61%
39%

Duties of Manager
78%
22%

Wisconsin statutes provide an example of the typical state statute that details the requirements
for selection of the manager:
The city manager shall be elected purely on merit. In electing the city manager the
council shall give due regard to training, experience, executive and administrative
ability, and efficiency and general qualifications and fitness for performing the
duties of the office, and no person shall be eligible to the office of city manager
who is not by training, experience, ability, and efficiency well qualified and
generally fit to perform the duties of such office. No weight or consideration shall
be given by the council to nationality, political, or religious affiliations, or to any
other considerations except merit and direct qualifications for the office (Wisc
Statutes Database Subch. 1 of Ch. 64 § 64.09 (2005)).

In cases where state law is less specific, the statute will contain a general statement that city
managers are to be hired based on professional qualifications.
In addition to mandating professionally competent managers, 38 states (78%) list the
duties city managers are to perform. Ten percent of states grant municipalities the authority to
assign duties to managers through local ordinances. The remaining 12% do not reference city
manager responsibilities in state legislative documents.
Chief Administrative Officers and State Law
Mayor-council municipalities seeking to enhance the professionalism of local
government may add an appointed chief administrative officer (CAO) to manage various
operations of the government. As noted previously, eighteen states expressly provide for the
option of appointing CAOs to mayor-council governments. These provisions typically include a
requirement for the administrator to be professionally qualified and to answer solely to the
mayor. For example, in Mississippi,
the council of any municipality adopting the mayor-council form
of government may, within its discretion, adopt an ordinance
providing that the mayor shall appoint, with the advice and consent
of the council, a chief administrative officer to coordinate and
direct the operations of the various departments and functions of
municipal government; such chief administrative officer shall
serve at the pleasure of the mayor and shall possess such
qualifications and experience as shall be set out in the aforesaid
ordinance. (Miss. Code § 21-8-25 1972).
Arkansas has an optional city administrator form of government. Although this form is
distinct from the council-manager form (also permitted under Arkansas law), the Arkansas
statutes mandate that council appoint the administrator and detail the administrator’s duties,
making the form nearly identical to the council-manager form of government.

Hybrid Forms of Government
In order for a local government to be classified as a hybrid form, there should be some
shift in the typical distribution of powers between the mayor and the council. Using the Nelson
and Svara (2010) typology, I classify hybrid municipalities as (1) those mayor-council
communities in which the CAO is appointed by the council (or council with the mayor serving
on council) instead of by the mayor independent of council (i.e., Nelson and Svara’s variation 3),
and (2) those council-manager cities in which the mayor (in place of the council) nominates or
appoints the manager (i.e., Nelson and Svara’s variation 4).
Referring again to Table 1, there are a very small number of municipalities nationwide
that fit these criteria in the population range of 10,000 and above. Mayors have a role in
appointing the manager separate from council (in council-manager form) in only 20
municipalities with populations of at least 10,000. In 239 mayor-council cities with a minimum
population of 10,000, the council appoints the CAO. It is difficult to make generalizations with
such small numbers of cases in statistical testing, particularly when aggregating to the state level.
However, it is enlightening to study the prevalence of these hybrid forms in relation to the level
of state structural autonomy.
As shown in Table 8, municipalities using variation 3 are found in fourteen states,
including two that do not allow for full customization of governmental form (Illinois and
Missouri). Illinois provides structural home rule for municipalities with a minimum population
of 25,000, but all municipalities are required to elect their mayors at-large. In Missouri, Kansas
City is the only municipality that departs substantially from the traditional council-manager form
by giving the mayor a greater role than is typical in both the appointment of the manager and the
budgeting process.

Variation 4 is found in twenty-nine states. Even states that do not give municipalities a
great deal of power to modify form often allow for the addition of a professional administrator
through the adoption of an ordinance. Since several states, including Illinois and Wisconsin,
require municipalities to seek approval through a referendum to change to council-manager form
but may add a CAO through ordinance, the adoption of a council-appointed CAO position may
be an attempt to add professional management in way that is most expedient.
Table 8. Hybrid Municipal Form and the Presence in the States
Autonomy to modify
form?
Yes
No

Number of states with municipalities using:
Variation 3
Variation 4
12
19
2
10

Classification of Municipalities
Twenty-eight states maintain legal classifications of municipalities, typically dependent
on population, which affects municipal structural characteristics. Often, the classifications
designate which municipalities are entitled to home rule status, although the minimum size varies
greatly between states. In Arizona, the minimum size is 3,500 while in Illinois the minimum is
25,000.
Six states restrict choices for form of government based on population classification.
Indiana, for example, dictates form of government. Only third class municipalities in Indiana
(those with populations under 35,000) are permitted to use council-manager government and the
mayor is responsible for appointing the manager under state law. First and second class
municipalities in South Dakota can choose one of three forms of government—mayor-council,
council-manager, commission. Third class cities or towns have town government, similar to
mayor-council but without a separately elected mayor.

New Jersey’s classification system is perhaps the most complicated. In addition to
classifying according to population, municipal governments can also be designated as cities,
towns, boroughs, villages, or townships. Within each subclass of government are various
choices for structural form; the details for all forms are expounded in state law.
Other states have specific provisions that dictate variation from the traditional
characteristics of mayor-council or council-manager governments. Massachusetts requires all
municipalities with populations above 150,000 to have council members elected by districts or
wards. In West Virginia, the term mayor-council government in state law refers to a hybridized
government form in which the mayor and council share legislative and administrative
responsibilities. State law designates what would normally be called mayor-council as “strong
mayor.”
Regression Analysis
Seven models were used to test the influence of state legislation on the adoption of forms
of municipal government. The percentage of each of the seven variations in forms of
government (from the Nelson & Svara 2010 typology) in use in each state for municipalities with
populations of at least 10,000 serve as the dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for the
dependent and independent variables (Table 9) shows considerable variation for most. However,
Variation 3, council-manager governments with empowered mayors, ranges from only 0% to
4.5% in the states.
Each of the seven models tests the proportion of one of the seven variations in
government form in each state against the primary independent variable of state autonomy and
the control variables—population growth rate, population density, per capita income, and region.
Models one, two, three, and seven were statistically significant. Model 1 tested the proportion of

council-manager governments with appointed mayors relative to the independent and control
variables. Although the overall model was significant (Table 10), the primary independent
variable—state autonomy to modify form—was not. Variables that were significant were
southern region (significance < .05) and midwest region (significance < .01). Though above the
.05 level of significance, population density was significant at the .1 level (p = .07). The
adjusted r-squared for the model was .167. Population density was negatively related to
proportion of council (mayor) manager governments—lower population density is associated
with higher levels of council-manager governments with appointed mayors.
The regression findings provide some support for the hypothesis. Greater state autonomy
was significantly related to higher proportions of council-manager government (though only
those with elected mayors) and negatively related to mayor-council governments without CAOs.
However, when examining the hybrid categories (Models 3 and 4), there was not a significant
relationship between autonomy and adoption of either category.
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable

N

Min.

Max.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Percent Variation 1: council (mayor)
manager

49

.00

75.00

17.72

19.28

Percent Variation 2: mayor‐council‐manager

49

.00

100.00

34.19

29.09

49

.00

4.50

.58

1.13

49

.00

52.90

7.70

11.90

49

.00

50.00

9.06

11.46

49

.00

33.30

6.21

9.57

Percent Variation 7: mayor‐council

49

.00

84.10

24.51

25.59

Per capita income (1999)

49

15,853.00

28,766.00

20,751.92

2,876.14

Population density—per square km (2000)

49

.4

438.00

70.18

97.59

Population growth 1990‐2000

49

.50

66.30

13.92

11.38

Percent Variation 3: empowered mayor‐
council‐manager
Percent Variation 4: mayor and council‐
administrator
Percent Variation 5: mayor‐council‐
administrator
Percent Variation 6: mayor‐administrator‐
council

Election of the mayor in the council-manager form is considered a departure from the
traditional elements of the form despite the fact that it is the more popular variation in practice.
The findings support the proposition that departures from a traditional form of government
require higher levels of structural autonomy from the state government. The inverse applies in
the case of mayor-council governments—as the default form of government in many states,
departures from the mayor-council form requires some level of structural autonomy from the
state.
Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Illinois have the highest numbers
of municipalities using the arrangement in variation 5—mayor-council form with a CAO
appointed by council. In these cases, state law does play an important role, although this role is
not reflected by the autonomy variable. In New Jersey and Pennsylvania, municipalities using
this variation are typically either borough or township forms of government, not mayor-council
cities. Minnesota law provides for a weak mayor municipal form that allows for the addition of a
CAO appointed by council. In Illinois and Wisconsin, municipalities can add a CAO through
ordinance and also determine how the CAO will be appointed—therefore, they can closely
approximate a council-manager form without attaining a vote through referendum to change to
the statutory council-manager form.
The regional dummy variable provided some interesting results as well. Findings
indicate that council-manager governments with appointed mayors are less common in southern,
western, and midwestern states than in northeastern states, with statistically significant
differences in the southern and midwestern states. This departs somewhat from earlier findings

that have indicated that council-manager governments are more common in the south and west
than in other regions.
Table 10. Regression Models: Form of Government Adoption and State Autonomy
Models (7‐Variation Form of Government)
Independent
Variables

1
Council
(Mayor)‐
Manager
.156

State
Autonomy

2
Mayor‐CM

6.027 .247* 14.400

South#

‐
21.77 .303 18.623
2

9.341

West

11.526
‐.612**

Midwest

Per capita
income 1999
Population
density
Growth rate
1990‐2000
Constant
R

2

Adjusted R

.003

‐.122

.309

.553
.453*

.373
‐54.497
(32.031)

.000
.000

‐.188

.053

.531**
‐.491
1.357
*

‐.290

.772
.674

.002

‐.081 ‐.411*
.044

.295

11.423

.001
‐.411

.546

‐2.249 .570** 1.494

.002 .314*

12.310 (26.527)

2

F

.234

.448* 1.078

11.423

‐
27.16 ‐.034
2

9.461

‐2.249

.539
.330

11.279

‐
17.52 ‐.081
4

‐.395

.237

6.822

5.649
‐.535*

3
Empowered
Mayor CM

‐.002
.003

‐.102

‐.010
.018

4
Mayor &
Council‐
Administrat
or
.018

.436

3.815
‐.030

‐.764

6.307
.021

.567

7.782
.352 9.640
6.388
‐.131

‐.001

.001
.149

.018

.030
‐.065

‐.068

.209

‐4.054 (1.552) 16.094 (17.911)

5
Mayor‐
Council‐
Administrat
or
‐.142‐3.253
3.590
‐.296‐7.154
5.936
‐.051‐1.338
7.325
.206 5.433
6.012
‐.312 ‐.001

6
Mayor‐
Administrator‐
Council
‐.079

.196
36.178
(16.858)

7.543

.619** 12.511 ‐.047 ‐2.552
4.921
.663*

12.472

14.596 .143 8.397

6.072
.255

15.389
5.608 .123 7.254

4.984

12.632
‐
.000
‐.004
.404*

.136
.001
.258

.028
‐.003 ‐.003

‐
‐
.16.65
.325*
7

2.976

.001
.236 .028

‐1.512

7
Mayor‐
Council

.002
.025 .514*

.023
‐.366

.135
.058

‐.308 ‐.213 ‐.478
.163

‐8.810 (13.975)

.412
102.767
(35.419)

.289

.544

.301

.149

.186

.198

.280

.167

.466

.182

.003

.047

.061

.157

2.527*

1.022

1.341

1.448

2.277*

2.377*

6.990***

Values shown are standardized coefficients, unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors below. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***
p < .001 (N = 49)
#
Northeast is the reference variable for the region dummy variable.
Variations: 1 = Council‐manager (appointed mayor); 2 = Council‐manager (elected mayor); 3 = Empowered mayor‐council‐
manager; 4 = Mayor and council‐administrator (council appoints CAO); 5 = Mayor‐council‐administrator (mayor nominates
CAO); 6 = mayor‐administrator‐council (mayor appoints CAO); 7 = Mayor‐council (no CAO)

When the numbers of each of the two types of council-manager government are
compared by region (northeast to south), the results suggest that while council-manager
government with an appointed mayor is preferred in the northeast over the south, the results are
reversed when comparing the council-manager with elected mayor. There are 146 municipalities
in the northeast with an appointed mayor but only 98 with an elected mayor. In the south, there
are only 66 council-manager municipalities with an appointed mayor, but 478 with an elected
mayor. Therefore, the total number of council-manager governments remains higher in the
south, though the elected mayor provision is preferred over the appointed mayor. In some cases,
this is due to state law mandating direct election of the mayor for most communities (i.e. Texas)
and in other cases (i.e. North Carolina), the state allows municipalities to choose the selection
method of the mayor. Region was also significant for Variation 6. Strong mayor-council
governments with a CAO are more common in the South and West than in the Northeast. In
these communities, the mayor selects the CAO who generally works at the behest of the mayor.
Per capita income was found to influence the choice of three variations in government
form. Both council-manager governments with an elected mayor (Variation 2) and empowered
council-manager governments (Variation 3, a hybrid) were related to higher levels of per capita
income. This finding is consistent with Simmons and Simmons’ (2004) determination that
higher education levels and a growing professional workforce were associated with the adoption
of the council-manager form.
Population density was related to both the adoption of the council-manager form with an
elected mayor (Variation 2) and mayor-council governments without CAOs (Variation 7). Prior
studies found mixed results for this variable. In this study, greater population densities were
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associated with lower proportions of mayor-council-manager governments and higher
proportions of mayor-council governments.
Finally, population growth rate was significantly related only to the proportion of mayorcouncil-manager governments. Higher growth rates were associated with higher proportions of
mayor-council-manager cities (Variation 2).
Discussion and Conclusion
These findings suggest that the Frederickson et al.’s (2004) hypothesis that adapted cities
are the modal form of government is questionable. While there is evidence that municipalities
are more likely to have professional management than not, whether this is a result of a conscious
decision to adapt or occurs for other reasons is not conclusive. In fact, even in states where
municipalities are free to adopt any variations in form of government they choose, there are only
a few truly hybridized systems adopted in the United States. Instead, evidence presented in this
paper suggests that most communities with populations of 10,000 and above are retaining
governmental structures that are consistent with the principles of either the council-manager or
mayor-council form.
Why are municipalities not hybridizing when they have the power to do so? The data
show that slight departures from traditional characteristics of the council-manager and mayorcouncil form are common. Popularly electing the mayor in the council-manager form and hiring
a CAO in the mayor-council form are the two most common deviations. However, substantively
altering the forms to the point where a change occurs between the balance of executive and
legislative power, creating a hybrid form, or changing to a different form is quite rare. This is
consistent with Svara’s argument that cities are more likely to modify institutional features
within their form rather than abandoning their form altogether (Svara, 1990).

Aside from autonomy, there are some patterns of associations between certain variations
in form and the control variables in the study. The results suggest that region, per capita income,
and population density may influence the choice of municipal government form whether
hybridized or of another type. Southern and midwestern cities are less likely to use the
traditional council-manager model (with an appointed mayor) than are northeastern cities. While
southern and western cities are more likely to use mayor-council-CAO forms with a strong
mayor than are northeastern cities. These findings are generally consistent with earlier
research—although previous studies used a dichotomous form of government variable.
Findings from this study indicate that state legislative provisions can be an important
variable influencing city government structural change. While in some states, few controls exist
at the state level, others greatly limit their municipalities’ ability to modify their government
form. Since variation is so great, it is an important consideration when tracking the
transformation of government features.
While earlier studies contend that municipalities transform their form of government to
optimize their performance, my findings suggest that choices such as granting greater mayoral
authority are not always within the realm of local government power. Structural autonomy is
greatly constrained by many states, particularly for smaller municipalities. Generally, home rule
municipalities have substantially more latitude when making structural changes. However, the
home rule designation does not guarantee structural free-reign. In order for studies to gauge
whether municipalities are intentionally choosing elements from both mayor-council and
council-manager forms of government, consideration of the influence by state government is
essential.

There are some limitations in this study that can be addressed in future research. In order
to achieve optimal accuracy with form of government characteristics, the dataset was limited to
municipalities with a minimum population of 10,000. Limiting population to 10,000 and above
undoubtedly means that a number of potentially hybrid municipalities are not counted. Future
research should explore patterns in small municipalities, particularly since these are the
communities that are typically most constrained by state law.
The level of state autonomy afforded to municipal governments is related to some of the
form of government choices in local government. Research that examines structural choices
only from the perspective of the local governments is missing part of the picture. These findings
indicate that departures in form from the traditional mayor-council or council-manager models
are not the modal form of local government in the United States and are not solely the result of
choices made at the local level.
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Appendix A
State Coding for Independent Variable—Number of Variations Permitted by State Law
Alaska
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana

1

2
2
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
6
5
7
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
3
3
7

North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming

3
7
3
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
7
5
7
7
4
3
7
7
4
5

From the Municipal Structure Dataset, 1,019 municipalities with populations of at least 10,000 (35%) use councilmanager form with a popularly elected mayor and 51% of mayor-council governments have CAOs.
2
The Municipal Structure Dataset compiled and maintained by Kimberly Nelson at Northern Illinois University.
3
For comparison purposes, the 2001 ICMA dataset had 1,848 cases with a population of at least 10,000 and the
NLC dataset contained 3001 cases with a population of at least 10,000.

